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


# CONTEMPORARY SAFETY?

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


# SAFETY WORK vs SAFETY OF WORK



# OPERATIONAL SAFETY

AIR CANADA FLIGHT 759: 7TH JULY 2017, SAN FRANCISCO







HOP is not a programme...

...its an operating philosophy

# THE HOP PRINCIPLES

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error is normal

blame fixes nothing

systems drive behaviour

learning is vital

response matters





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# ERROR IS NORMAL

PRINCIPLE #1





Have you  
made an  
**ERROR** at  
work?





# A CHOICE?

"worker's don't **cause** failures.  
Worker's **trigger** latent  
conditions that lie dormant in  
organisations waiting for this  
specific moment in time"

CONKLIN, 2018



# LOOKING BEYOND HUMAN ERROR

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“Underneath every simple, obvious story about ‘human error’, there is a deeper, more complex story about the organization”

Dekker, 2014







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# BLAME FIXES NOTHING

PRINCIPLE #2





# EXPLANATION



"The unknown brings with it danger, disquiet, worry - one's first instinct is to get rid of these awkward conditions...

...the first idea which can explain the unknown as known feels so good that it is 'held to be true'."

Nietzsche, 1888



# TO BLAME OR UNDERSTAND

“

When you plant lettuce, if it does not grow well, you don't blame the lettuce. You look for reasons it is not doing well. It may need fertilizer, or more water, or less sun. You never blame the lettuce. Yet if we have problems with our friends or family, we blame the other person.

But if we know how to take care of them, they will grow well, like the lettuce.

Thích Nhất Hạnh



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# SYSTEMS DRIVE BEHAVIOUR


PRINCIPLE #3







# SYSTEMS THINKING





# “PILOT ERROR”

2ND OCTOBER 2015: JALALABAD AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN





# SIGNIFIERS

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“some sort of indicator,  
some signal in the  
physical or social world  
that can be interpreted  
meaningfully”

Norman, 2011





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# LEARNING IS VITAL

PRINCIPLE #4






is failure bad?






WE NEED TO  
REMOVE THE WORD  
**FAILURE** FROM OUR  
VOCABULARY,  
REPLACING IT  
INSTEAD WITH  
**LEARNING**  
**EXPERIENCE**

NORMAN, 2013



# WORK AS PLANNED vs WORK IN PRACTICE





“Workers are Masters of Complex Adaptive Behaviour”

**“masters of the blue line”**

Conklin & Edwards, 2018

# THE DOMINANT ACCIDENT MODEL





# THE SWISS CHEESE FALLACY

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The SCM **does not** provide a detailed accident model or a detailed theory of how the multitude of functions and entities in a complex socio-technical system interact and depend on each other.

REASON ET AL., 2006

# THE SWISS CHEESE FALLACY

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the SCM has an indisputable value as a means of communication, as a heuristic **explanatory** device.

REASON ET AL., 2006



# A 'MESSY' STORY

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# RESPONSE MATTERS

PRINCIPLE #5






# OUR CHOICE...

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You can learn and improve or  
you can blame and punish. You  
cant do both.

CONKLIN







# RESPONSES TO LOOK OUT FOR

## STOP & AVOID

"You cant fix stupid"

"If only they had..."

"What were they thinking?"

"Why did no one stop the work?"

"Had they done a JSA?"

## DEVELOP

"How did we make this situation more likely"

"What is the organisations responsibility here?"

"What can we learn from this?"





# RESTORATIVE JUST CULTURE




"An incident is something you've already invested in, what you need is to get a return on that investment.

A **restorative just culture** allows you to get that return, to learn from it, to not send people away who were involved in it, because they're actually the embodiment of the really expensive lesson that you're not learning."

"Just Culture | The Movie", 2018

# COMPLIANCE MONITORING

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# DISCOVERING SAFETY

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feels **overly**  
**cautious**

clearly **safe**  
to do work

**"THE GREY AREA"**

**uncertain** interpretation  
of safe work


feels **too risky**

clearly **not safe**  
to do work



# AFTER AN EVENT

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**safe** to do work

clearly '**the right way**'

**not safe** to do work

clearly '**the wrong way**'

"after the event, **Safety is clear**"

# CAPTAIN HINDSIGHT


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# PRESSURE TO FIX

“the **pressure to fix...**  
outweighs the desire to  
learn”

Edwards, 2018







**SLOW DOWN & LEARN**

# THE HOP PRINCIPLES

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THANKYOU!