

独断-주장-自己主張-sự quyết đoán

Assertiveness in the Asian Culture

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
Human Risk Manager
Operations



1986-
2017



- Multimodal Safety Management Systems & Human Factors
- Crew Resource Management, 2010 (NASA-University of Texas at Austin)
- Crew Resource Management, 2018 (NASA-US Federal Aviation Administration)



Assertiveness


独断 (Dúduàn)
주장 (Jujang)
自己主張 (Jiko shuchō)
sự quyết đoán


Assertiveness involves three dimensions: **Active Listening, Speaking Up and Performing an Action**

Outline

1. Socio-Political/ Socio-Cultural contemporary foundations of assertiveness in Asian culture
2. Small Group Activity on Assertion
3. Aviation Example of Non-Assertiveness
4. Reviewing Culture, CRM & Error

Socio-Political Contexts





Hongkong, 2019

Socio-Cultural Context



Manila, 1986

Socio-Cultural Context



Influences of Socio-Cultural/Political Contexts on Asian Disposition to *Assertiveness*



- Strong team orientation; bonded together to protect shared Values
- Protect collective rights and principles
- Deep sense of Compassion for other team members
- Facilitates operation during emergencies (power-distance) requiring command and control



- High Power-Distance can discourage information-sharing
- Promoting more assertion, as “assertiveness training” for junior members to seniors may not work
- Asking for group input may be difficult

Stereotyping Asian Docility (Low-Assertion)



South China Post (2014, Jingan Young):


- Cabin crew uniforms figured out in a dispute (2014, CX) where the Union noted CX cabin crew uniforms were “too revealing” in that these were “too tight, too short”, which have contributed to an increase in sexual harassment occurrences especially with members of the airline’s frequent flyer (Marco Polo) Club

Question: Is the uniform really to blame?

There is a more troubling issue at work here which have to do with **perceptions of Asian women as "submissive and docile"** largely contribute to the unwanted attention and treatment they receive in the workplace. In a now defunct Cathay campaign features a photograph of a flight attendant who was quoted as saying "I love helping people even before they ask".

Assertion Activity


17 September 2019



Crew Attitudes: Assertion in an Asian Example

Excerpt from the (Cockpit) Voice Recorder, CVR

“I knew this was the first time the captain was flying the Hongkong IGS Visual Step Down approach. My student Flight Engineer saw the anti-skid fail light come on. I told him to just switch it (all) off. At about 300 ft AGL, I could see the captain having a hard time at the controls during the approach...”



B747-200 Flight Engineer's Panel



Accident Findings

- The Aircraft had no Anti Skid Protection at all
 - Twelve (12) tyres burst after touchdown
 - Aircraft was disabled on RWY13
 - All incoming flights were diverted to alternate airports
 - Organisational & Political: Bad publicity for the airline
-



Crew Demographics

Captain

- 13,000 Total Flying Time
- First Solo to HKG after 2 Route Checks
- Previously B737-300 Captain flying domestic

First Officer

- 1,100 Total Flying Time; mostly spent in B747-200 as First Officer
- More Senior (in years of service) than the Captain

Check/Instructor Engineer

- New as a Check/Instructor Engineer
- Air Force background (Colonel)

(Trainee) Flight Engineer

- This flight was to be his Release Check as a Flight Engineer
 - He was an Air Force Captain before joining the airline
-



The US\$3.4 Million Question:

Why did the Trainee Flight Engineer obey an erroneous command from the Check/Instructor Engineer when he knew it was the wrong procedure to shut off all hydraulics on the Hongkong IGS Approach?

Exploring Cultural Solutions

Professor Geert Hofstede (1980)

88,000 Respondents from a large multinational corporation

- ***High Power-Distance Index*** (leaders are expected to be direct & decisive; followers are expected to obey)
 - ***Low Individualism Index*** (collectivist culture where membership in a group implies moral and personal commitment to the group)
-

My Investigation Findings and Assertion

This is a Cultural and Assertion Problem:

- The Trainee Engineer actively listened, did not speak out, and complied with the command from his Instructor Engineer even if he knew **it was the wrong thing to do;**
 - The Instructor Engineer was of a higher rank (Colonel); he was only a Captain;
 - Obeying a Command was a correct (optimizing) response rather than follow training standard.
-

Collectivist vs. Individualist Cultures

Individualist Culture:

- ***INDIVIDUAL*** Rights are important;
 - The political system is founded on the belief that people will pursue their own self-interest and the aggregate effects of those individual pursuits, properly regulated, will culminate to the common good.
-

What is S.I.R.?

- Where open and free communication may be the feature of the Western Anglo Saxon Flightdeck with the utmost concern concern of arriving at a **Social Product** (conclusions, outcomes, agreeing to disagree etc.)
 - the Collectivist Asian Team places highest importance instead, on the **Social Process** (tact, cautious words, overly willing to coordinate, keeping the peace etc.)
-

S.I.R. at HKG IGS Approach

S.I.R = “**S**mooth **I**nterpersonal **R**elationships”

- The Captain was having a hard time on the approach...(High Power-Distance)
- Anti-Skid Fail Light ON...(“I am being sensitive to the situation and need to maintain trouble-free and smooth relationships)
- Obeying an erroneous Command...(Being agreeable even under difficult circumstances)

Adapted from Hollnsteiner, M & Kaut, P. (1978). Smooth Interpersonal Relationships in the Philippine Setting.



What the Airline did to Explore Cultural Solutions

- Find out the Cultural “Precursors” to Error, and not just the Individual Causal Factor to the incident;
 - Survey the crew—there will be systemic (and hidden) cultural reasons;
 - Engage the line pilots—they know what is happening out there;
 - Establish crew resource management with cabin crew, pilots, engineers and ramp staff.
-

Exploring Cultural Solutions

NASA/UT/FAA Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire examined three overarching clusters of flight management attitudes:

- Command Responsibility
- Communication & Coordination
- Recognition of Stressor Effects


Kanki, B., Helmreich, R.L. & Anca, J. (2007). Crew Resource Management, Academic Press: San Diego.

The same error, different consequences...that's why the Context of an Incident is important.




Hayward, B. & Paries, J. (2000). Concept and Graphic Dedale Asia Pacific.

Investigating the RMS Titanic



Integrated Investigations

- Nautical Advisor—not right to impose safety regulations, because maritime was the safest mode of travel
- Captain Smith ignored iceberg warnings
- Lookout had not binoculars




- Shortage of skilled labour
- No emergency evacuation training
- No emergency drills
- Rush to meet record voyage times—excessive speed

- Dark and poor weather conditions
- Insufficient lifeboats
- Brittle Hull Steel
- Low-grade rivets



- Maturing Culture: are your **Values and Beliefs Compatible?**
- Do you **Understand your RISKS?**
- Vulnerability: Can you Predict your Next Accident?

Increasing Protection



Increasing Vulnerability

- Staff Loyalty: Do we desire **Team Success or Individual Wins?**
- Are Our Leaders more concerned about KPIs and Self-Preservation or about **Safety & the Common Good?**
- Safety Information: is it **Meaningful to a few or is it Owned by ALL?**

Anca, J (1993). Why Prayers bring few miracles. PAL Report. Manila:1993.


Conclusion

- Summary
- Further research and examination

People: The Character of Action

People will only defend the organisation if it feels that the more basic concerns are addressed.

Though commercial goals will be achieved, dealing with catastrophes will be elusive



PEOPLE
The Who
Character of
Action

SYSTEM
The How
Process of Action

RISK
The What IF
Control of Action

What then appears is a situation where safety culture is broken and not integral to the way things are done.